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The Non-Linear Impact of Digitization on Remittances Inflow: 




Due to the impact of COVID-19, it is important now more than ever to analyze the relationship between the improvement in 
digitization and the flow of remittances in order to fill the void that has come as a result of stay at home and quarantine orders. 
Using a comprehensive measure of digitization that encompasses the commonly used proxies of financial technology (Fintech) 
and employing a System Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) panel estimation methodology on annual data over the period 
2004-2018, this paper examines the impact of digitization, as a proxy of Fintech, on the inflow of remittances for a sample of 34 
developed and developing countries. Our analysis provides a case study on Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa 
(BRICS), known as five emerging markets with a great number of workers out of abroad and below the average level of digital 
transfers. Using the Digital Ecosystem Development Index developed by Katz and Calorda (2018), the results of the paper 
uncover a statistically significant nonlinear relationship between the improvement in digitization measures and the inflow of 
remittances with an exact threshold level. More specifically, our results for the full sample indicate that improvement in 
digitization may initially increase the remittances inflow leading to an increase in the stock of remittances received. Nevertheless, 
once the digitization index reaches its threshold level further improvement in digitization tends decrease as penetration increases, 
giving rise to a decline in the rate of remittances inflow. This result implies that the marginal effect of the digital penetration is 
larger when at its lower level, before the threshold level. For countries such as the BRICS, with a level of digitization below the 
average of our sample, policy makers should apply more aggressive and comprehensive policies to recoup the maximum gains of 
a digital ecosystem. Hence, our policy implications are directed towards increasing the investments in developing human capacity 
including carrying different skill development training programs to prepare individuals for the information age, expanding the 
internet coverage and speed especially in educational establishments, encouraging the use and access of electronic banking by 
consumers, producers, and governments, and taking cyber security and fraud protection more seriously to encourage the flow of 
remittances, especially in light of its renewed utility due to the recent pandemic.  
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In 2018, over 200 million migrant laborers sent over 689 billion USD to respective countries of origin, 
with approximately 529 billion USD to developing countries1. With the acceleration of globalization, 
international cooperation has been further strengthened. As a result, labor outflows are quicker than they used 
to be. Laborers, especially those who are from developing countries, may take advantage of the income gap 
between developed and developing countries to remit remittance back to their home countries. This concept is 
known as migrant remittance flow.  
Remittance flow2 is a transfer of money, often by a foreign worker to an individual in their home country. 
Money sent home by migrants competes with international aid as one of the largest financial inflows to 
developing countries. Workers’ remittances are a significant part of international capital flows, especially with 
regard to labor-exporting countries. With the improvement of financial openness and economic liberalization, 
the government restrictions in remittance has been alleviated, and therefore an increasing number of other 
forms of foreign exchange transfer by overseas migrants have been increased, and the conventional forms of 
international remittances have been supplemented by an increasing number of remitters. The concept of 
international remittances is no longer limited to remittances at the family level. At present, governments and 
some international economic organizations have recompiled the data according to the Balance of Payments 
Manual 6th edition (BPM6) framework, and most of the data on international migrant remittances are well 
documented. The data for the standard component items is gradually updated and reclassified.  
Remittance flows to Low- and Middle-Income Countries (LMICs) Other than China surpassed foreign 
direct investment (FDI) in 20153, becoming the largest source of foreign exchange earnings in the LMICs, 
reported from the World Bank (2017). And up to 2018, Remittance flow is $689 BN worldwide, $529 BN in 
developing countries, and $158 BN in BRICS.4 
Figure 1 
Remittances Inflows Increase In LMICs and the Rest of the World 
 
Source: Authors based on data from World Bank staff calculation based on data from IMF Balance 
of Payments Statistics database and data releases from central banks, national statistical agencies,  





1 For more data on remittance flows, "Remittances Matter: 8 Facts You Don’t Know About The Money Migrants Send Back Home | UN DESA | 
United Nations Department Of Economic And Social Affairs". UN DESA | United Nations Department Of Economic And Social Affairs, 
2020,https://www.un.org/development/ desa/en/news/population/remittances- matter.html  
 
2 For a discussion of the definition of remittances, see Dilip Ratha, 2003, "Workers’ Remittances: An Important and Stable Source of External 
Development Finance", Global Development Finance 2003, World Bank. Data since 2005 are based on IMF BOP Statistics that use the 
definitions of IMF BPM6.  
 
3 See appendix A in World Bank (2017) for data and forecast methods.  
4 Visit https://www.knomad.org/ to get the latest data. 
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Figure 2 
Remittances Inflows Increase Inside and Outside of BRICS 
 
                 Source: Authors based on data from World Bank Migration and Remittances Data 
 
The average inflow of remittances in the BRICS region has increased by about 12 folds over the period 
from 1998-2008. This is a significant increase compared with the other developing countries where the average 
remittances inflow has increased by about 5 folds only over the same period, as shown in Figure 2. This 
substantial increase in average remittances inflow in the BRICS region is mainly derived from the steep 
increase in remittances in both India and China over the same period, reaching around $79 BN and $67 BN in 
2018, respectively, as shown in Figure 3.  
Figure 3 
Remittances Inflows Increase Among BRICS Countries 
 
                 Source: Authors based on data from World Bank staff calculation based on data 
                 from IMF Balance of Payments Statistics database and data releases from central  
                 banks, national statistical agencies, and World Bank country desks. 
 
Multiple factors are responsible for the variations in remittance flows over the recent years. Among a 
group of major factors, the development of financial inclusion has played a significant role. Financial 
inclusion, as United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)5 defines it, is an effective 
access and use by individuals and firms of affordable and sustainable financial services from formal providers. 
Demirguc-Kunt et.al (2012) posited that " Without inclusive financial systems, poor people must rely on their 
own limited savings to invest in their education or become entrepreneurs -and small enterprises must rely on 
their limited earnings to pursue promising growth opportunities. This can contribute to persistent income 
inequality and slower economic growth."  
 
5 United Nations Conference on Tarde and Development is a permanent intergovernmental body established by the United Nations General 
Assembly in 1964. Read more about UNCTAD on https://unctad.org/  
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To the countries whose financial markets are undeveloped, financial inclusion help them to diversify risk, 
lower income inequality, contribute to the global managing system and finally become a significant factor for 
economic growth. First of all, financial inclusion is a main access to activate the poorest to save (Dupas and 
Robinson, 2013) through utility improvement (Beck et al., 2007). Secondly, financial inclusion may increase 
the total welfare of society through consumption smoothing (Appelli and Pagano, 1989; Bacchetta and 
Gerlach, 1997; Ludvigson, 1999). Moreover, for the developing countries where trust systems are needy, 
financial inclusion is an opportunity for these countries to become a part of global financial system (Cihak et 
Al., 2016). Therefore, the strengths of financial inclusion finally power up the engine of economic growth, as 
well as reducing the risk and level of inequality (IMF, 2016; Emara and El Said, 2020; Emara and Rojas, 
2020).  
An important tool of financial inclusion is financial technology (FinTech), which in turn requires an 
enabling environment with a well-established digital ecosystem that encompasses the infrastructure of digital 
services, connectivity of devices, the digital transformation of households and production, the development of 
digital industries, and the availability of digital factors of production. FinTech provides people with an 
alternative lending access, changes payments and transfers (Juan J. Cortina Sergio L. Schmukler, 2015). 
FinTech happened to be a perfect way to sustain the social distancing rule as well, after Coronna virus began to 
wreak havoc in 2020. Offline banking systems were transformed online. It turns out that people are 
increasingly getting use to mobile banking and online banking supported by FinTech. Recently, FinTech has 
attracted huge amounts of investment. The funding from venture capitalists in technology sectors has risen 
from $414 million in 2014 to $608 million in 2018, according to the Financial Times (IFC, 2017). Another 
prominent example for FinTech is blockchains. According to a world bank research paper published in 2015, 
(Juan J. Cortina Sergio L. Schmukler, 2015), through a network called miner, blockchains automatically 
packaged and recorded the transfer from party A as a block, sending it to party B. The whole process is lacking 
intermediaries who typically charge high fees and cost a lot of time when transferring. Other kind of FinTechs, 
including mobile payment, saves a lot of time for individuals when transfer, which actually help commercial 
banks to enlarge their digital business, while weakening real business.  
The boom of digitization and FinTech6 is changing the remittance system profoundly. First of all, they no 
longer need to bare the heavy remittance fee while making the transactions, which significantly improve 
workers’ willingness to bill the remittance; On the other hand, the receiver from home country would have a 
more convenient access to the remittance. With the unprecedented infectious disease forcing people to embrace 
digital transferring, the future of digital remittance and other forms of remittance stimulated by FinTech would 
sure to be prosperous.  
Figure 4 
Impact of COVID-19 on Remittances  
 
        Source: Sayeh and Chami (2020) based on World Development Indicators Database. 
 
 





Due to the precautions that have to be taken as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, digitization and 
financial technology have become more important to remittances than ever before. Projections by the World 
Bank (2020) have revealed that remittances could decline by 20% as a result of changes in migrant employee 
wages. This is significant because remittances typically have a profound impact on developing countries 
through alleviating poverty and improving living standards through education and employment. These 
outcomes are not as likely to happen without the development of digital solutions for remittances because 
people no longer have the option to access physical bank and financial institution branches. Thus, it is 
important to analyze the relationship between financial technology, or more broadly digitization, and 
remittances.  
The digitization levels in BRICS region are still at its infancy. As per Figure (5), the average level of the 
Digital Ecosystem Development Index for the BRICS region is very low compared to other countries in our 
sample, only surpassing that of Côte d’Ivoire and Nicaragua. Hence, there are significant benefits that await 
the region from applying aggressive policies to fast track the digitization process especially to overcome the 
negative shocks on remittances inflow due to the recent pandemic. We believe that increasing the investment 
in mobile data, digital media, internet access, as well as encouraging the use and the access of electronic 
banking by consumers, enterprises, and governments along with investments in cyber security and fraud 
protection would significantly simulate workers to remit back the money.  
 
Figure 5 
The Digital Ecosystem Development Index - 2018  
 
                 Source: Authors. Data from Katz and Callorda (2018) 
 
Against the above background, the study contributes to the literature by using a comprehensive measure of 
digitization that goes beyond the commonly measures of FinTech in an attempt to answer the following 
questions: How digitization affects remittances inflow in developed and developing countries? Is the 
relationship linear or non-linear? Is the effect the different for the BRICS region? The rest of this paper will be 
divided as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature; Section 3 describes the data used; Section 4 highlights the 
methodology employed and the model specification; Section 5 presents our results; Section 6 concludes; and 
Section 7 includes the references. The appendix is at the end of the paper.  
 
2. Literature Review 
 
There is a reasonable amount of literature on the determinants and impact of financial technology as a tool of 
financial inclusion, its link to the flow of remittances, and economic growth.7 However, the literature that 
examines the role of a comprehensive digital ecosystem as an enabling environment for remittances inflow and 
the possible presence of a non-linear relationship between these two variables is very thin.  Hence, we briefly 
outline the most commonly cited literature on the financial and macroeconomic determinants of remittances.  
 
7 For a detailed survey on the literature on the relation between financial development and growth, see Levine (1997, 1999a). 
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Using data from 109 countries for the period 1975-2007, Aggarwal, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Martínez Pería 
(2011) find that remittances are significantly positively correlated with bank deposits and credit. Along the 
same lines, using a panel dataset of 38 developing countries over the period 2001-2002, Inoue and Hamori 
(2016) use the commercial branch network and reach the same conclusion. Employing a dynamic panel ( on a 
sample of 187 countries over the period 2004-2015, Ben Naceur, Chami, and Trabelsi (2019) find that 
remittances have a positive effect on financial inclusion only when they are above a certain percentage of 
GDP, with the threshold for LMIC countries ranging between 12.28% and 22%. This implies that if the 
remittances are below this threshold, they are not saved by rather consumed or invested. If above the threshold, 
there is greater probability that money is saved in formal banking institutions, which promotes inclusion. 
In the studies based on household surveys, findings generally indicate that remittances are significantly 
positively associated with whether a household has a bank or savings account. Using household survey data 
from El Salvador over the period 1996 - 2002, Anzoategui, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Martínez Pería (2014) find 
that remittances are positively and significantly correlated with households’ use of deposit account. Similarly, 
using data from 7,572 Mexican households from the years 2002 and 2005, Ambrosius and Cuecuecha (2016) 
find that remittances are significantly positively correlated with the household's ownership of savings accounts 
and recent borrowing.  These authors also note that the remittances drive borrowing from informal channels, 
which highlights the deficiencies of the formal financial sector in addressing the needs of these households. 
Chishti (2007) studied the dramatic growth in remittances in the Indian economy over the period 1990-2005. 
He finds that liberalizing policy measures from the government and banking institutions had expected effects 
which manifested in two major ways: firstly, remittances moved increasingly into formal channels from 
informal networks, and secondly, more non-resident Indians are becoming investors rather than pure savers.8  
Transactional cost is an important determinant of remittances flow. A global survey of remittance flows 
from central banks, including those of the BRICS nations, found that most respondents from central banks in 
both receiving and sending countries cited the high cost of remittances as the biggest factor preventing 
migrants from using formal channels. The lack of bank branches in the region of the remitter and the inability 
of the remitter/receiver to open a bank account were listed as the second major obstacle. In addition, the lack of 
and/or distrust of electronic transfer information and distrust of formal financial institutions impedes the use of 
formal channels and can have a significant impact on the recipient country’s remittance inflow.  
Several studies investigate the relationship between transaction costs and remittance flows. Using panel 
data on remittance flows to Pakistan from 23 host countries, Ahmed, Martinez-Zarzoso (2016) find that the 
effect of transaction costs on remittance flows is negative and significant. Thus, a high transaction cost reduces 
the rate of remittance flows through formal channels. Improved access to financial services is noted as 
opportunities to reduce costs and enhance financial inclusion, redirecting informal flows to formal channels. 
Similarly, Freund and Spatafora (2008) highlight that countries with high transaction costs (i.e. Mali, Armenia, 
Moldova) experience larger informal remittance flows. They explain the dramatic increase in recorded 
remittances to Latin America since 1995 as reflecting a shift from informal to formal remittances. They 
attribute this shift to FinTech developments and competition reducing transaction costs in the formal financial 
sector.  
FinTech is one aspect of financial inclusion9, which refers to emerging technologies that increase access to 
financial services. Examples include mobile banking, which allows individuals with formal bank accounts to 
engage in quick digital transactions over their mobile phones. Another is mobile money, which allows for 
activities such as deposits, withdrawals, and transfers all without a bank account. A prominent example of 
mobile money is M-Pesa, which originated in Kenya in 2007 and has been very successful in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, spurring the creation of more mobile money services in the region. Another area of promise is that of 
blockchain-based technologies, which remove the third-party intermediaries who charge high transaction fees. 
Thus, FinTech can reduce delays and costs involved in cross-border remittances. Using data from 21 Western 
European countries to 7 countries in the European Neighboring Region, Schiopu and Siegfried (2006) find that 
remittances increase when remittance costs are lower. In a World Bank research paper, Cortina Lorente and 
Schmukler (2018) note that as the use of FinTech providers has increased, remittance costs have declined and 
the speed of transactions has increased. Continuing with the same pattern, Singh (2010) studies the impact of 
transfer costs and efficiency on worker’s remittances in India. He finds that antiquated financial infrastructure 
 
8 You can check the paper freely from the link: http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/rise- remittances- india- closer- look  
 
9 For detailed discussion on the literature on financial inclusion, check Emara and El Said (2020) and Emara and Moheildin (2020). 
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and high transfer costs that come as a result of these old systems impact the level of remittances to a country. 
Lower transfer costs as well as increased time efficiency that come as a result of digitization both increased 
remittances over the medium-term. 
Along the same lines, there is recent research investigating the macroeconomic impact of digitization, 
especially after the COVID-19 pandemic. The study of Katz, Jung, and Callorda (2020) shows empirical 
evidence that high level of digitization is important for alleviating the bad consequences of the pandemic. In an 
International Telecommunication Union (ITU) report, Katz (2020) finds that advanced levels of digital 
infrastructure create a resilient economy in the face of pandemics. Focusing on the impact of digitization on 
remittances and using data from the Global Findex and Global FinTech Index, Lyons et al (2020) study the 
impact of digital FinTech development across 16 emerging economies. They find that countries with more 
developed digital payment systems (i.e. China, South Africa) are more likely to send and receive remittances 
using a mobile device or financial institution. They also find that that use of digital financial services increases 
the likelihood of remittances via both mobile phones and financial institutions, but with the magnitude of the 
effect greater for mobile phones than formal institutions. They also find a positive and significant relationship 
between FinTech development and remittances sent or received via mobile phone, especially for Asia. These 
relationships are likely due to a reduced cost of remittance as a result of FinTech developments.    
To the best of our knowledge, only few studies examined the nonlinear macroeconomic impacts of 
FinTech or digitization10on either the economy, or specifically on remittances. Vu (2011) studies the impact of 
the usage of personal computers, mobile phones and Internet penetration for a sample of 85 countries over the 
period 1996-2005. The study provides evidence of a positive of Information and communications technology 
(ICT) on economic growth, however this impact lessens with more penetration.  Along the same lines, Hawash 
and Lang (2010) used a sample of 33 developing countries over the period 2002-2006 and confirmed that high 
levels of Information Technology (IT) adoption leads to negative effects on total factor productivity, 
confirming the presence of a non-linear relationship. Similarly, in studying the German economy over a period 
of 45 years Lang (2009) finds that the positive impact of R&D on the stock of knowledge is unsustainable and 
is decreasing over time. For a sample of Sub-Saharan African countries over the period 1990-2014, Albiman 
and Sulong (2017) provide evidence that fixed telephone mainlines, mobile phone and internet subscriptions, 
all per 100 inhabitants, have non-linear effects on economic growth, with a definite estimated threshold level 
for each ICT variable. On another note, The IMF study of Kpodar and Adranaivo (2011) on a group of African 
countries over the period 1988-2007 uses three measures of ICT: mobile phones, Internet penetration, and 
fixed telephone lines to find evidence of a positive linear impact on economic growth with no evidence of non-
linear effects. 
Aside from the impact of digitization on simulating remittances, a large portion of existing literature on 
remittances focuses on said individual motives. Stark (2009) identifies altruistic migrants as those who remit 
more the poorer their recipient family. Tullao and Cabauy (2016) point out that under this altruistic motivation, 
remittances increase when the home country and/or recipient family are hit with negative income shocks. 
Insurance motives are those that are intended to protect the recipient family from risks insure against 
unexpected income variation. As a result, it is not surprising that if inflation increases in a migrant’s home 
country, their remittances increase as well in order to ensure their family can maintain their living standard. 
Using a matched sample of Nigerian immigrants in Chicago and their families back in Nigeria, Osili (2007) 
finds both altruistic and insurance motives for remittance, suggesting that migrants tend to remit more when 
recipient household’s purchasing power decreases due to inflation. Moreover, he notes that migrants may send 
remittances earlier to serve as savings in the case of an economic downturn. Using a cross-section dataset from 
2003 surveys in the Philippines, Alba and Sugui (2003), find that economic shocks (such as increased 
inflation) in the country of the recipient family will lead to increased remittance inflow. Using data from the 
Philippine economy over the period 2000-2019, Rivera and Tullao (2020) find that increased inflation 
statistically significantly increases remittance sending, as migrants want to help recipient households smooth 
and maintain their consumption. This supports the altruism and investment motives. Similarly, using data from 
the Egyptian economy over the period 1967-91, El-Sakka and McNabb (1999) find that home country inflation 
has a positive and significant impact on remittance inflow.  This information is in line with findings from Oded 
Stark (2009), Tullao and Cabuay (2016), Relian Edgar Soriente (2018), and Christopher Cabuay (2018). 
 
10 Along the same lines, Emara and Kasa (2020) find a statistically significant non-linear effect of financial access index (measured principal 
component analysis of two variables measured per 100,000 adults: number of bank branches per and number of ATMs) on the accumulation of 
domestic savings for a group of emerging markets.  
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Being a part of a global financial system provides ample opportunity for these countries. A study by 
Gupta, Pattillo, and Wagh (2007) on the impact of remittances on poverty and financial development in Sub-
Saharan Africa found that trade openness has positive relationship with remittances. By joining a global 
financial system, these countries increase their opportunity to trade with other nations conditioned on the 
exchange rate, among other macroeconomic determinants. In that context, existing literature deems the 
relationship between exchange rates and remittances to be a significant positive relationship. Lucas and Stark 
(1985) examine the motivations of migrant workers from Botswana to remit and find that currency 
depreciation increases remittances. In line with his prior research, Stark and Taylor (1991) find similar results. 
Faini (1994) studies five Mediterranean countries over the period 1977-1989 to determine how responsive 
remittances are to certain macroeconomic factors and confirmed that real exchange rate is a significant and 
positive determinant of remittances, as depreciation in the home country leads to higher remittances. 
Additional empirical support on the positive relationship between exchange rate and remittances inflow is 
found in El-Sakka and McNabb (1999), Dakila and Claveria (2007), Pant and Budha (2016), and Kuncoro 
(2020).   
Continuing on with the pattern of examining factors affecting the flow of remittances, Loschmann and 
Siegel (2015) find that migrants who are debt-financed, send less remittances than migrants who are not. 
Another interesting takeaway from their research is a negative relationship between interest rates and 
remittances. In a similar manner, Rahman (2013) studies the source of funds for migrants from Bangladesh and 
also found that increased interest rates decreased remittance flows. Research on how lending rates impact 
remittances by Hassan and Homes shows that in the long run, increases to real lending rates decrease 
remittances. Similar empirical finding is reached in the study of El-Sakka and McNabb (1999). Furthermore, 
the study of Faini (1994) does not find a significant effect of interest rates on remittance flows. Similarly, in 
studying the determinants of remittances in Caribbean countries, Alleyne et al (2008) find the interest rate 
differential to be an insignificant determinant of remittances in their preferred model. Along the same lines, the 
relationship is also found to be insignificant by Swamy (1981) and Straubhaar (1986) and Schiopu and 
Siegfried (2006). This suggests that the findings on this relationship are inconclusive. 
 Against the above background, our study estimates the remittances model by including the frequently 
cited variables in the literature and focusing on a comprehensive measure of digitization that encompasses the 
FinTech indicators commonly used in the literature (such as fixed broadband subscriptions, mobile money 
subscriptions, Internet access, etc.) as well as a broader set of indicators covering important complementary 
aspects of an economy such electronic banking, digital supply chain, human capacity, E-government, cyber 





The panel data set covers 34 countries from East Asia & Pacific, Europe & Central Asia, Latin America & 
Caribbean, Middle East & North Africa, North America, and Sub-Saharan Africa over the period 2004-201811. 
The list of countries included in the sample is reported in Tables A1 of the Appendix. 
 The dataset is constructed from the World Development Indicators (WDI) of the World Bank’s 
database12. The dependent variable in the model is personal remittance received (as a percent of GDP) and the 
set of independent variables consists of the real GDP growth rate, GDP deflator, openness, real effective 
exchange rate, and real interest rate. Additionally, our regressors’ set includes the Digital Ecosystem 
Development Index developed by Katz and Callorda (2018), which cover 8 pillars and 64 indicators13. The 
eight pillars cover digital connectivity, household digitization, digitization of production, digital industries, 
factor of digital production, digital competitive intensity, and regulatory framework and public policies. Tables 
A2 and A3 of the Appendix reports the descriptive statistics of the macroeconomic and digitization variables, 
respectively. And Table 1 below provides a detailed list of the macro and digitization variables used, their 
definitions, units of measurement, abbreviations, and data sources.  
 
 
11 We started with the widest possible data on our dependent variable, remittances received (% of GDP). 
12 The data that support the findings of this study are openly available in the World Bank Database at 
https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/dataset/world-development-indicators. 
 
13 More details on the index are available in Katz and Callorda (2018), Annex B, pp 19-22. 
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Remittance Personal remittances, received (% of GDP). Percent of 
GDP 
remit WDI 
Growth of real 
per capita GDP 
Growth rate of real GDP per capita (constant 2000 US$). Percent gr WDI 
Deflator GDP deflator (base year varies by country). Index def WDI 
Real Interest 
Rate 
The lending interest rate adjusted for inflation as measured 
by the GDP deflator. 
Percent ri WDI 
Openness (% of 
GDP) 
The sum of net exports of goods and services, net primary 









It is measured based on the Principal component analysis of 
the following eight pillars. 







It comprises 4 sub-pillars including investments, quality of 
services, coverage and service infrastructure. It is measured 
based on 15 indicators such as telecommunication 
investment, fixed broadband connections and coverage, 
number of secure servers, and satellites. 







It contains 3 sub-pillars covering affordability, penetration 
and ownership. It is measured based on 11 indicators such 
as mobile broadband subscription and penetration, 










It contains 4 sub-pillars covering internet use, E-
government, E-commerce, and over the top media services 
(OTTs). It is measured based on 7 indicators such as 
percentage of population using the internet and using 
dominant social network, mobile data average revenue per 
use (ARPU), E-government index, internet commerce, 
national health policy, and video on demand penetration. 







It contains 4 sub-pillars of digital infrastructure, digital 
supply chain, digital distribution, and digital processing. It 
is measured based on 6 indicators including the percentage 
of enterprises with internet access, electronic banking, and 
using internet to sell and buy products. It also includes the 
percentage of workers using the internet and computers. 






It contains 4 sub-pillars of export, weight of digital 
industries, internet of things (IoT), and content production. 
It is measured based on 7 indicators such as high 
technology exports, computer software spending, and 











It contains 5 sub-pillars of human capital, schools, 
innovation, investment in innovation, and economic 
development. It is measured based on 8 indicators such as 
education years expectancy, educational establishments 
with internet access, and R&D spending. 







It contains sub-pillar of competition level and is measured 
based on 4 indicators such as the Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index (HHI) fixed broad band, mobile broad band, pay TV, 
and mobile telephony. 








It contains 2 sub-pillars including cyber-security & piracy, 
and government role. It is measured based on 4 indicators 
covering percentage of non-licensed installed software and 
its commercial value, the percentage of regulatory agency 
attributions, and functions based on International 
Communication Union (ITU) regulatory tracker. 






4. Model Specification and Estimation Methodology 
 
We start the estimation methodology by examining the impact of changes in the macroeconomic variables on 
the inflow of remittances. Second, we analyze the impact of the improvement in digitization on the inflow of 
remittances. Third, we test the potential non-linear relationship between digitization and remittances. And 
finally, we focus the analysis on the BRICS countries to study how they might differ from the rest of our 
sample.  
The remittances model is estimated using System GMM panel estimation methodology proposed by 
Arellano and Bover (1995), Blundell and Bond (1998), and Blundell, Bond, and Windmeijer (2001)14 to 
examine the impact of changes in the macroeconomic variables and digitization levels on the inflow of 
remittances. Our main model is as follows, 
 
																	"#$%,' = ) + 	+"#$%,',- + 	./%,' + 0123%,' +	4%,'																																																																		(1) 
                            i = 1, 2,…N, t  = 2004,…T 
 
Where Remit refers to remittances received (as a percent of GDP15) by country i at time t, Remiit-1 is the AR(1) 
endogenous variable,  Xi,t is the set of regressors, Digi,t represents the main digitization index and its eight 
pillars, each one in a turn, and εit is the error term of the regression. The set of regressors include growth rate of 
real GDP per capita, GDP deflator, real interest rate, openness (% of GDP), and exchange rate. It is important 
to note that Equation (1) will be estimated for the main digitization index and its eight pillars, each one in a 
turn, to analyze which area contributes the most to remittances inflow.  
The model is expanded to allow us to differentiate between the BRICS countries and the rest of our sample 
in the effect of digitization on remittances inflow. To do so we add a dummy variable “BRICS”, which is 1 
when a country is among the five BRICS countries and 0 otherwise, along with its interaction term with the 
digitization index, as follows.  
 
"#$%,' = ) + 	+"#$%,',- + 	./%,' + 0123%,' + 89":;<%,' + =(9":;<%,' ∗ 123%,') +	4%,'																		(2) 
                            i = 1, 2,…N, t  = 2004,…T    
 
The total effect of a digitization in the BRICS region is estimated by adding up the coefficient δ to the 
coefficient = and their statistical significance is determined by from the variances and covariance of the 
variables 9":;<%,' and Digi,t. Further, to examine the potential non-linear effect of digitization on remittances 
inflow, the squared term of the digitization index is added to the model as follows, 
 
"#$%,' = ) + 	+"#$%,',- + 	./%,',- + 0123%,' − B123%,'C + 89":;<%,' + =D123%,' ∗ 9":;<%,'E			 
																																																																																	−	F(123%,'C ∗ 9":;<%,') +	4%,'																																										(3) 
                                                                                  i = 1, 2,…N, t  = 2004,…T 
 
For the full sample analysis, we set the BRICS dummy to zero, and by computing the first derivative of 
Equation (3) with respect to the 123%,' variable, we get HIJKL,MHN%OL,M	 = 0 − 2 ∗ B123%,'. We do expect that a positive 0 
coefficient and a negative B coefficient which implies that a one unit increase in the digitization index 
increases remittances by a magnitude of 0, however this effect is increasing at a decreasing rate of “2 ∗
B”.	Additionally, the cut-off point (or threshold level) of the digitization index, or 123%,'∗ 	will be equal to 
R SCTRwhere any level of 123%,' below 123%,'
∗ will result in a positive increase in remittances inflow and any level 
above it results in a rate decrease. Additionally, the total effect of the digitization index on remittances is 
estimated by adding the coefficient 0 to the coefficient B and the statistical significance of the effect is 
estimated using the standard errors of these two coefficients.  
Similarly, For the BRICS sample, the dummy BRICS takes 1 in Equation (3) and the impact of digitization 
would be computed as 
HIJKL,M
HN%OL,M	
= (0 + =) − 2 ∗ (B + F)123%,', Thus, for the BRICS region we expect that the 
impact of digitization on remittances is positive with a magnitude (0 + =)	that decreases with a rate of 2 ∗
 
14 For more details on the estimation methodology, please check Emara and Kasa (2020). 
15 To control for country size. 
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(B + F)	and with a cutoff point of R (SUV)C∗(TUW)R. And the total effect of digitization is computed by adding the 
coefficient 0, =, B, and	F and jointly tested using the F-test. 
 
5. Estimation Results 
 
In this section we use the Arellano-Bond System GMM estimation methodology to estimate the main model of 
remittances inflow under six specifications and to analyze the impact of digitization for both the full sample 
and the BRICS region. The set of instruments used in the model passed the relevance and the over-
identification tests ensuring that simultaneous causality and possible correlation between country’s fixed 
effects and the set of explanatory variables are under control. All estimation tables report the Arellano-bond 
autocorrelation test and the Hansen over-identification test to confirm the absence of serial correlation in 
second order and that the set of instruments used is over-identified. 
As a starting point, we estimate the baseline model for the full sample. Table A5 of the Appendix shows 
the estimation results of the remittances model, where Column (1) confirms that the autoregressive term is 
positive and statistically significant as expected and consistent with the results of Gupta, Pattillo, and Wagh 
(2007). In Column (2), when GDP growth rate is added to the model, the coefficient of the lagged remittances 
remains positive and statistically significant. The results of this column show that the coefficient of GDP 
growth is also significant where a 1% increase leads to about 8.79% (of GDP) increase in remittances received. 
This goes in line with the results Niimi and Ozden (2008) who found that a 3% increase in economic growth 
resulted in a 7% increase in remittances inflows as well as Wandati (2013), Schrooten (2005), and Siddique et. 
al (2012), ensuring that economic growth is an important determinant of remittances received.  
Column 3 adds the GDP deflator to the model as a proxy for macroeconomic stability (Walsh and Wu, 
2010), where the results show that 10% increase in the deflator leads to about 0.016% (of GDP) increase in 
remittances received. It is important to note that both the coefficients on lagged remittances and GDP growth 
continued to be statistically significant after the inclusion of the price measure. This result support the findings 
of cycle (Osili 2007), Stark (2009), Tullao and Cabuay (2016), Alba and Sugui (2009), Relian Edgar Soriente 
(2018), Christopher Cabuay (2018)  Rivera and Tullao (2020) and El-Sakka and McNabb (1999) that the 
increase in prices in the receiving country leads to more remittances inflow.  
When we add the measure of openness to the model in Column 4, our results show that a 10% increase in 
the openness measure leads to an increase in remittances received by around 0.07% of GDP, an expected 
result, at the five percent significance level. This result confirms the findings of the IMF study by Gupta, 
Pattillo, and Wagh (2007) that trade openness is a statistically significant determinant of remittances, reflecting 
the fact that labor mobility and commodity trade are complementary. Next, Columns (5) shows that adding the 
real effective exchange rate has a statistically significant impact on remittances, where a 10% currency 
depreciation leads to about 0.25% increase remittances inflow and aligning with the results from the literature 
(Lucas and Stark, 1985; Stark and Taylor, 1991; Faini 1994; El-Sakka and McNabb 1999; Dakila and Claveria 
2007; Pant and Budha 2016; Kuncoro 2020) that domestic currency depreciation, statistically significantly 
reduces the transaction cost for the remitter, and thus increases the inflow the remittances in the receiving 
country. 
The last column of our main model, Columns (6), shows that adding the real interest rate does not provide 
a statistically significant impact on remittances received, even though we expect a negative relationship 
between how an expansionary monetary policy leads to reduction in the cost of debt repayments for the 
remitter, and thus increases the inflow of remittances in the receiving country (Loschmann and Seigel, 2014; 
Rahman 2013; Hassan and Holmes, 2018). Our result, however, is in line with the empirical evidence provided 
by Straubhaar (1986) who found that changes in real interest rate did not impact remittances inflow because 
political stability was more of a significant determinant of remittances in Turkey. Additionally, our result 
aligns with the empirical findings of Swamy (1981), Straubhaar (1986), Faini (1994), Alleyne et al (2008), and 
Schiopu and Siegfried (2006) that interest rate has an insignificant impact on remittances inflow suggesting 
that investment motive is not leading the flow of remittances. Furthermore, continuing with Column (6) the 
coefficient on openness turned to an insignificant impact after showing a significant result in Column (4). This 
result is in line with the literature on the non-robust relationship between the increase in the current account 
deficit and the different types of capital flows (Koepke, 2015; Emara & El Said, 2020). 
To analyze the impact of digitization on remittances inflow in the full sample, Table A6 reports the results 
of adding the Digital Ecosystem Development Index and its eight pillars to our baseline model, each one in a 
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turn. Column (1) shows that a 10% increase in the Digital Ecosystem Development Index, or digindex, leads to 
about 0.05% increase in remittances inflow, an expected statistically significant result. Columns (2) to (9) 
show the addition of the eight pillars of digindex to our main model, each one in a turn. All digitization pillars 
have a positive and statistically significant impact on remittances received, with the exception of the comp 
pillar. As per the results, the highest impact comes from the eco pillar, followed by instar, digprod, fp, infra, 
conn, then dighou where a 10% increase in each of these pillar results in 0.093%, 0.0508%, 0.0462%, 
0.0461%, 0.0373%, 0.0363%, and 0.0315% increase in remittances received, respectively. These results are in 
line with the empirical evidence provided in Hawash and Lang (2010), Vu (2011), Kpodar and Adranaivo 
(2011) Albiman and Sulong (2017), Katz, Jung, and Callorda (2020), Katz (2020), and Lyons et al. (2020) who 
confirm the presence of statistically significant positive effects of digitization on the economy. 
Next, to examine the potential non-linear effect of the improvement in digitization on remittances inflow 
in the full sample, Table A7 shows the estimation results after expanding our main model by adding the 
squared term of the digitization index and its eight pillars, each one in a turn. Column 1 shows that digindex 
has a statistically significant positive effect on remittances inflow, where a 10% increase in this index results in 
an increase in remittances by about 0.14%, however this rate is increasing at a decreasing rate of two times 
0.00113, or 0.0023%, with a threshold level of about 61.66 points16, which is on the 75th percentile of the 
index. Furthermore, the table shows the computation of the total effect of digindex by adding its coefficient to 
the coefficient of its square term as explained in Equation (3), we find that the total effect of a 10% increase in 
digindex leads to a statistical significant increase in remittances of about 0.139%. This result is consistent with 
the evidence provided in Lang (2009), Hawash and Lang (2010) Vu (2011), and Albiman and Sulong (2017) 
who find evidence of non-linear effects of different ICT measures on productivity and economic growth. 
Moreover, Table A7, confirms that this positive non-linear impact of digitization is mainly derived from 
the positive significant non-linear impact of the eco pillar, followed by dighou, digprod, infra, fp, comp, and 
then instr, where a 1% increase in each of these pillars results in an increase in remittances inflow by about 
0.0347%, 0.0194%, 0.0188%, 0.0147%, 0.012%, 0.0108%, and 0.0104%, respectively. The threshold levels of 
each pillar are reported in Column (4). It is important to note that the conn pillar does not show a statistical 
significant non-linear effect on remittances. 
Next, in order to analyze how the levels of digitization in the BRICS can affect remittances received in this 
region as compared with our full sample. Table A8 presents the results of expanding our linear model by 
adding an interaction term for the BRICS dummy variable as explained in Equation (3). More specifically, the 
dummy variable for the BRICS region is interacted with digindex, infra, conn, dighou, digprod, comp, eco, fp, 
and instr, each one in a turn. Column (1) reports the coefficients of the digindex, its eight pillars, and their 
interaction terms with the BRICS dummy. The total effects of digitization are computed by adding the 
coefficient of digindex or its pillars, each one in a turn, to the interaction term with the BRICS dummy, as 
explained in Equation (3) of the previous section. 
Column (2) shows the computation of the total effect of the digindex and its eight pillars on the flow of 
remittances into the BRICS region. The results suggest that a 10% increase in digindex results in 0.062% 
increase in the inflow of remittances into the BRICS region. This effect is about 23% higher than that of the 
full sample17. 
Next, looking at the results of the eight pillars, the results show a statistically significant positive impact 
on remittances with the exception of comp and instr pillars. Similar to our result for the full sample, the highest 
and the second highest effects are coming from the eco and the fp pillars, where a 10% increase in these pillars 
leads to an increase of 0.135% and 0.079% in remittances received in the region, which are about 1.5 and 1.7 
folds the impacts for the full sample, respectively.18 
Additionally, the results confirm a positive and statistically significant impact of the remaining four pillars 
on remittances inflow, with the highest impact derived from digprod, followed by infra, dighou, and then conn 
where a 10% increase in each of these pillars leads to 0.068%, 0.060%, 0.044%, and 0.042% increase in 
remittances received in the BRICS region, respectively. Again, the coefficients of digprod, infra, dighou, and 
conn for the BRICS sample are about 1.47, 1.61, 1.40 and 1.16 times the coefficients of the full sample, 
respectively19.  
 
16 The index ranges from 3.03 points to 81.53 points, check Table 3 of the Appendix for descriptive statistics. 
17  Refer to Table A6 for the full sample results. The coefficient of digindex is 0.00504. 
18  Refer to Table A6 for the full sample results. The coefficient of eco and fp are 0.0093 and 0.00461, respectively. 
19  Refer to Table A6 for the full sample results. The coefficient of digprod, infra, dighou, and conn are 0.00462, 0.00373, 0.00315, 0.00363, 
respectively. 
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Finally, to check the potential non-linearity impact of digitization on remittances in the BRICS region, 
Column (1) of Table A9 shows the estimation results of adding the quadratic term of digitization index along 
with its interaction term with the BRICS dummy variable. With the exception of infra and conn pillars, the 
results of Column (2) show that the digindex and its eight pillars have non-linear effects on remittances flow 
into the region. More specifically, Column 1 shows that digindex has a statistically significant positive effect 
on remittances, where a 10% increase in this index results in an increase in remittances inflow by about 
0.259%, however this effect is increasing at a decreasing rate of two times 0.0037, or 0.0023%, with a 
threshold level of about 34.88 points, which is under the 50th percentile of the index. 20 Additionally, Colum (3) 
shows the computation of the total effect of digindex by adding its coefficient to the coefficient of its square 
term as shown in Equation (3), we find that the total effect of a 10% increase in digindex leads to a statistical 
significant increase in remittances of about 0.256%, about 1.8 folds the impacts for the full sample21. 
The results of Column (3) indicate that this positive non-linear impact of digitization in the BRICS region 
is mainly derived from the positive significant non-linear impact of eco, followed by digprod, instr, dighou, fp, 
and then comp, where a 1% increase in each of these pillars leads to an increase in remittances inflow by about 
0.662%, 0.352%, 0.285%, 0.231%, 0.198%, and 0.153%, which are about 1.91, 1.87, 2.74, 1.19, 1.65, and 1.42 
times the coefficients of the full sample, respectively22. The threshold levels of each pillar are reported in 
Column (4). The results of Columns (5) and (6) confirm the absence of serial correlation in second order and 




Using a comprehensive measure of digitization that encompasses the commonly used measures of FinTech and 
employing a System GMM estimation methodology on a sample of 34 developed and developing countries 
over the period 2004-2018, our results confirm that improvement in a country’s digital ecosystem simulates 
individuals to remit their money back to the home country and provides a convenient way for individuals, 
businesses, and governments to get the money digitally in the receiving country.  
The study reveals a non-linear (quadratic) impact of the improvement in the digital ecosystem on the 
inflow of remittances, where a 10% increase in the comprehensive digitization index results in an increase in 
remittances inflow by about 0.14%, however this effect is increasing at a decreasing rate of 0.0023%, with at 
total effect of 0.139%, and a threshold level of about 61.66 points, which is on the 75th percentile of the index 
in our sample.  Additionally, our results show that this positive non-linear impact of digitization on the inflow 
of remittances is mainly derived from the non-linear effects of the eco pillar, followed 
by dighou, digprod, infra, fp, comp, and then instr pillars, with a definite threshold level for each pillar. 
Given that the mean of the digitization index for the BRICS region of 32.18 points is lower than the 
threshold level of the comprehensive digitization index for the full sample, our results confirms that 
improvement in digitization has a higher impact in BRICS region than the full sample, which is mainly derived 
from the non-linear impacts of eco, followed by digprod, instr, dighou, fp, and then comp. 
For the full sample and the BRICS region, we find that the index of factors of digital production (or the 
eco index) has the highest impact on remittances inflow as compared to the other digitization pillars. For 
instance, for the full sample, the magnitude of the total effect of the eco index is about 2.42 times the average 
of the other 6 significant pillars (conn was insignificant). And for the BRICS region, the total effect of the eco 
index is about 2.71 times the average of the other 5 significant pillars (conn and infra were insignificant). 
Additionally, for the BRICS sample, our results show that the impact of Regulatory Framework and Public 
Policies Index (or Instr index) on remittances inflow is about 2.74 times the full sample. This result imply that 
tracking the percentage of non-licensed installed software, its commercial value, and the percentage of 
percentage of regulatory agency attributions and functions based on ITU regulatory tracker is crucial for 
encouraging remittances inflow into the BRICS region. 
Finally, the duality of the pattern of the non-linear relationship between the improvement in digitization 
and remittances inflow implies that countries with relatively low levels of digitization, such as the BRICS 
region, would benefit the most from a developed digital ecosystem. Hence, our policy implications are directed 
 
20 The index ranges from 3.03 points to 81.53 points, check Table 3 of the Appendix for descriptive statistics. 
21  Refer to Table A7 for the full sample results. The coefficient of digindex is 0.0139. 
22  Refer to Table A7 for the full sample results. The coefficient of eco, digprod, instr, dighou, fp, and then comp are 0.0347, 0.0188, 0.0104, 
0.0194, 0.012, and 0.0108 respectively. 
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towards increasing the investments in human capital with widening the accessibility of internet use in 
educational establishments, increasing the investment in mobile data, digital media, internet access, as well as 
encouraging the use and the access of electronic banking by consumers, enterprises, and governments. Finally, 
with the rising levels of mobile and internet use, especially due to the impact of COVID-19, policy makers 
must invest in cyber security and fraud protection to minimize cyber threats, protect and encourage workers 
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Table A1: List of Countries 
Country ID Country Code Region Income Classification 
1 Australia AUS East Asia & Pacific High income 
2 Bolivia BOL Latin America & Caribbean Lower middle income 
3 Brazil BRA Latin America & Caribbean Upper middle income 
4 Bulgaria BGR Europe & Central Asia Upper middle income 
5 Canada CAN North America High income 
6 Chile CHL Latin America & Caribbean High income 
7 China CHN East Asia & Pacific Upper middle income 
8 Colombia COL Latin America & Caribbean Upper middle income 
9 Costa Rica CRI Latin America & Caribbean Upper middle income 
10 Czech Republic CZE Europe & Central Asia High income 
11 Côte d'Ivoire CIV Sub-Saharan Africa Lower middle income 
12 Dominican Republic DOM Latin America & Caribbean Upper middle income 
13 Hong Kong SAR, China HKG East Asia & Pacific High income 
14 Hungary HUN Europe & Central Asia High income 
15 Iceland ISL Europe & Central Asia High income 
16 India IND South Asia Lower middle income 
17 Israel ISR Middle East & North Africa High income 
18 Italy ITA Europe & Central Asia High income 
19 Japan JPN East Asia & Pacific High income 
20 Korea, Rep. KOR East Asia & Pacific High income 
21 Malaysia MYS East Asia & Pacific Upper middle income 
22 Mexico MEX Latin America & Caribbean Upper middle income 
23 Netherlands NLD Europe & Central Asia High income 
24 New Zealand NZL East Asia & Pacific High income 
25 Nicaragua NIC Latin America & Caribbean Lower middle income 
26 Paraguay PRY Latin America & Caribbean Upper middle income 
27 Russian Federation RUS Europe & Central Asia Upper middle income 
28 South Africa ZAF Sub-Saharan Africa Upper middle income 
29 Sweden SWE Europe & Central Asia High income 
30 Switzerland CHE Europe & Central Asia High income 
31 United Kingdom GBR Europe & Central Asia High income 
32 United States USA North America High income 
33 Uruguay URY Latin America & Caribbean High income 
34 Venezuela, RB VEN Latin America & Caribbean Upper middle income 







Table 2: Descriptive Statistic of Economic Variables 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
remit 2592 4.69 6.68 0.00 44.13 
gr 2636 0.02 0.05 -0.98 0.80 
def 2836 170.65 324.55 10.63 5983.91 
op 2302 91.97 55.99 18.23 434.42 
reer 1423 100.30 21.44 54.59 740.61 




Table 3: Descriptive Statistic of Digitization Variables 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
digindex 1110 44.33 18.42 3.03 81.53 
infra 1110 35.69 18.80 0.94 93.61 
conn 1110 53.29 25.06 0.00 95.72 
dighou 1110 38.12 21.73 1.07 91.44 
digprod 1110 54.46 31.16 1.45 100.00 
comp 1110 64.64 19.45 5.73 96.76 
eco 1110 17.77 10.07 0.68 55.78 
fp 1110 34.55 21.58 1.03 83.62 




Table 4: Descriptive Statistic of Digitization Variables in the BRICS Region 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
digindex 75 32.18 12.34 8.37 55.41 
infra 75 22.96 12.57 2.58 47.50 
conn 75 43.32 21.56 7.34 85.72 
dighou 75 31.49 16.95 6.17 68.44 
digprod 75 31.98 20.33 2.48 67.36 
comp 75 51.96 16.01 18.62 76.59 
eco 75 12.64 4.96 5.90 23.89 
fp 75 23.83 11.72 7.85 43.15 

















Table A5: Remittances and Macroeconomic Variables – Full Sample 
      Dependent variable: Remittances, Received (% of GDP) 
   Estimation Method: Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond Dynamic Panel System GMM. 
Regressors (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
L.remit 0.537*** 0.837*** 0.763*** 0.755*** 0.593*** 0.654*** 
 (0.120) (0.0289) (0.0346) (0.0680) (0.155) (0.103) 
gr  8.786*** 11.37*** 5.543*** 3.521** 2.792* 
  (2.067) (2.391) (1.545) (1.683) (1.482) 
def   0.00156*** 0.00141* -0.000620** -0.000571** 
   (0.000602) (0.000827) (0.000309) (0.000260) 
op    0.00701** -0.00858 -0.00229 
    (0.00321) (0.00569) (0.00421) 
reer     0.0245** 0.0187** 
     (0.0106) (0.00798) 
ri      -0.00926 
      (0.0105) 
Observations 2,408 2,391 2,391 1,969 1,058 698 
Countries 181 179 179 171 87 65 
Arellano-Bond 
Test 
Order 1 p-value    



















Hansen p-value 0.013 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.284 0.348 
                           Notes:   ***, **, * and *’ denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10%, and 15% levels respectively. 




                                 Table A6: Remittances and Digitization – A Linear Model – Full Sample  
                                 Dependent variable: Remittances, Received (% of GDP) 
                                 Estimation Method: Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond Dynamic Panel System GMM. 
Regressors (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
L.remit 0.995*** 0.987*** 0.994*** 0.979*** 1.008*** 1.005*** 0.994*** 0.998*** 0.988*** 
 (0.0419) (0.0474) (0.0479) (0.0507) (0.0341) (0.0262) (0.0385) (0.0403) (0.0312) 
gr -0.810 -0.854 -0.804 -0.842 -0.689 -0.843 -1.106 -1.268 -0.729 
 (0.919) (0.913) (0.904) (0.902) (0.968) (0.937) (0.966) (0.990) (0.961) 
def 6.39e-05 7.62e-05*’ 5.76e-05 7.90e-05*’ 0.000103 1.31e-05 8.39e-05 9.01e-05 5.54e-05 
 (4.84e-05) (5.12e-05) (5.22e-05) (5.59e-05) (7.54e-05) (3.02e-05) (6.02e-05) (6.70e-05) (5.12e-05) 
op 0.00164 0.00223 0.00184 0.00250*’ 0.00169*’ 0.00140 0.00207*’ 0.00239*’ 0.00148 
 (0.00132) (0.00162) (0.00154) (0.00163) (0.00116) (0.00134) (0.00140) (0.00148) (0.00112) 
reer 0.00305 0.00284 0.00357 0.00307 0.00224 0.00187 0.00245 0.00279 0.00262 
 (0.00682) (0.00671) (0.00676) (0.00687) (0.00705) (0.00542) (0.00699) (0.00723) (0.00678) 
ri -0.00407*** -0.00367*** -0.00402*** -0.00377*** -0.00487** -0.00420* -0.00394** -0.00435** -0.00431*** 
 (0.00140) (0.00131) (0.00146) (0.00136) (0.00208) (0.00242) (0.00178) (0.00182) (0.00150) 
digindex 0.00504**         
 (0.00204)         
infra  0.00373*        
  (0.00211)        
conn   0.00363**       
   (0.00174)       
dighou    0.00315*      
    (0.00161)      
digprod     0.00462***     
     (0.00175)     
comp      0.00418    
      (0.00396)    
eco       0.00930**   
       (0.00407)   
fp        0.00461**  
        (0.00188)  
instr         0.00508*** 
         (0.00195) 
          
Observations 420 420 420 420 420 420 420 420 420 
Countries 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 
Arellano-Bond Test          
Order 1 p-value   0.035         0.034 0.035 0.034 0.036 0.037 0.035 0.036 0.035 
Order 2 p-value   0.525          0.516 0.580 0.508 0.511 0.541 0.471 0.474 0.529 
Hansen p-value 0.393      0.437        0.259        0.381        0.293         0.447          0.521        0.513        0.404 
                              Notes:   ***, **, * and *’ denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10%, and 15% levels respectively.  Numbers in round parentheses (.) are the robust 
                              standard errors .                              
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 Table A7: Remittances and Digitization – Non-Linear Model – Full Sample 
 Dependent variable: Remittances, Received (% of GDP) 
 Estimation Method: Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond Dynamic Panel System GMM. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Regressors Coefficient & 
Interaction 












digindex 0.0140* 0.0139* 61.66* 34/420 0.041 0.378 
 (0.00768) (0.0076)   0.495  
Digindex2 -0.000113*      
 (6.73e-05)      
infra 0.0149 0.0147* 49.97* 34/420 0.039 0.491 
 (0.00926) (0.0101)   0.453  
Infra2 -0.000149*      
 (8.53e-05)      
conn 0.00953 0.0095 80.89 34/420 0.041 0.389 
 (0.00766) (0.0076)   0.573  
conn2 -5.89e-05      
 (5.94e-05)      
dighou 0.0196* 0.0194* 37.34* 34/420 0.021 0.483 
 (0.0120) (0.0118)   0.983  
dighou2 -0.000263*      
 (0.000146)      
digprod 0.0189*** 0.0188*** 70.33*** 34/420 0.040 0.472 
 (0.00711) (0.0071)   0.492  
digprod2 -0.000135**      
 (5.27e-05)      
comp 0.0109* 0.0108* 80.60* 34/420 0.039 0.428 
 (0.00564) (0.0056)   0.488  
comp2 -6.74e-05*      
 (3.96e-05)      
eco 0.0354*** 0.0347*** 26.43*** 34/420 0.039 0.435 
 (0.0136) (0.0133)   0.432  
eco2 -0.00067***      
 (0.000256)      
fp 0.0126** 0.012** 55.68** 34/420 0.037 0.319 
 (0.00545) (0.0054)   0.464  
fp2 -0.000113**      
 (5.08e-05)      
instr 0.0105*’ 0.0104*’ 60.55*’ 34/420 0.041 0.213 
 (0.00658) (0.0115)   0.482  
instr2 -8.69e-05      
 (6.44e-05)      
                Notes:   ***, **, * and *’ denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10%, and 15% levels respectively.   
                    Numbers in round parentheses (.) are the robust standard errors. Column (1) refers to the coefficients ! and " in Equation (3).  
                   The total effects in Column (2) are computed by adding the coefficients ! and ". In Column (3) the threshold levels are equal to $ %&∗($.   
                   This computation is done for the comprehensive digitization index and its eight pillars, each one in a turn. 






















Table A8: Remittances and Digitization – Linear Model – BRICS 
Dependent variable: Remittances, Received (% of GDP) 
Estimation Method: Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond Dynamic Panel System GMM. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Regressors Coefficient & 
Interaction 










digindex 0.00488** 0.0062** 34/420 0.034 0.348 
 (0.00201) (0.0029)  0.533  
Digindex*BRICS 0.00127     
 (0.00197)     
infra 0.00350* 0.0060** 34/420 0.034 0.394 
 (0.00205) (0.0030)  0.525  
infra*BRICS 0.00250     
 (0.00154)     
conn 0.00357** 0.0042** 34/420 0.034 0.235 
 (0.00177) (0.0019)  0.583  
conn*BRICS 0.000604     
 (0.000875)     
dighou 0.00297* 0.0044* 34/420 0.034 0.341 
 (0.00161) (0.0023)  0.515  
dighou*BRICS 0.00139     
 (0.00161)     
digprod 0.00451*** 0.0068** 34/420 0.036 0.287 
 (0.00175) (0.0030)  0.517  
digprod*BRICS 0.00225     
 (0.00263)     
comp 0.00417 0.0048 34/420 0.037 0.429 
 (0.00399) (0.0046)  0.547  
comp*BRICS 0.000588     
 (0.00114)     
eco 0.00874** 0.0135*** 34/420 0.034 0.498 
 (0.00414) (0.0051)  0.485  
eco*BRICS 0.00474     
 (0.00367)     
fp 0.00418** 0.0079*** 34/420 0.035 0.458 
 (0.00187) (0.0027)  0.484  
fp*BRICS 0.00374**     
 (0.00165)     
instr 0.00434 0.0063 50/674 0.026 0.232 
 (0.00427) (0.0076)  0.434  
instr*BRICS 0.00197     
 (0.00371)     
               Notes:   ***, **, * and *’ denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10%, and 15% levels respectively.   
               Numbers in round parentheses (.) are the robust standard errors. Column (1) refers to the coefficients ! and )	Equation (2).    
               In Column (2) the total effects are computed by adding the coefficients ! and ). 












Table A9: Remittances and Digitization– Non-Linear Model – BRICS 
Dependent variable: Remittances, Received (% of GDP) 
Estimation Method: Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond Dynamic Panel System GMM. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Regressors Coefficient & 
Interaction 
Linear & Non-
Linear Total Effects  












digindex 0.0145*’    34/420 0.041 0.367 
 (0.00918)     0.489  
Digindex*BRICS 0.0114* 0.0259*      
 (0.00601) (0.0134)      
digindex2 -0.000112       
 (8.03e-05)       
digindex2*BRICS -0.000260* -0.00037* 0.0256* 34.88*    
 (0.000139) (0.0002) (0.0029)     
infra -0.00236    34/420 0.032 0.366 
 (0.0470)     0.525  
infra*BRICS 0.0154** 0.0130      
 (0.00674) (0.0440)      
infra2 6.44e-05       
 (0.000529)       
infra2*BRICS -0.000285 -0.00022 0.0128 29.51    
 (0.000218) (0.00072) (0.0433)     
conn 0.00971    34/420 0.041 0.382 
 (0.00829)     0.576  
conn*BRICS 0.00447 0.0142      
 (0.00417) (0.0111)      
conn2 -5.68e-05       
 (6.23e-05)       
conn2*BRICS -6.90e-05 -0.00012 0.0141 56.36    
 (6.11e-05) (0.00012) (0.011)     
dighou 0.0133*’    34/420 0.040 0.226 
 (0.00861)     0.474  
dighou*BRICS 0.0101* 0.0234*      
 (0.00592) (0.0132)      
dighou2 -0.000121*’       
 (7.67e-05)       
dighou2*BRICS -0.000216* -0.00034* 0.0231* 34.73*    
 (0.000128)  (0.0130)     
digprod 0.0197**    34/420 0.040 0.439 
 (0.00772)     0.489  
digprod*BRICS 0.0160* 0.0357**      
 (0.00949) (0.0154)      
digprod2 -0.000139**       
 (5.69e-05)       
digprod2*BRICS -0.000332*’ -0.00047* 0.0352** 37.86**    
 (0.000210) (0.00025) (0.0151)     
comp 0.0110*    34/420 0.038 0.416 
 (0.00580)     0.487  
comp*BRICS 0.00440 0.01544**      
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 (0.00346) (0.0072)      
comp2 -6.81e-05*’       
 (4.30e-05)       
comp2*BRICS -7.29e-05 -0.00014* 0.01530** 54.75**    
 (6.18e-05) (0.0001) (0.0071)     
eco 0.0402***    34/420 0.039 0.448 
 (0.0148)     0.423  
eco*BRICS 0.02848’ 0.0685**      
 (0.0185) (0.0277)      
eco2 -0.00074***       
 (0.000274)       
eco2*BRICS -0.00161* -0.00236** 0.0662** 14.53**    
 (0.000843) (0.0010) (0.0277)     
fp 0.0125**    34/420 0.008 0.308 
 (0.00584)     0.466  
fp*BRICS 0.00751 0.0200*      
 (0.00753) (0.0112)      
fp2 -0.000111**       
 (5.44e-05)       
fp2*BRICS -0.000183 -0.0003*’ 0.0198* 34.11*    
 (0.000177) (0.0002) (0.011)     
instr 0.0109    50/674 0.028 0.165 
 (0.00855)     0.446  
instr*BRICS 0.0179 0.0289*      
 (0.0133) (0.0154)      
instr2 -6.43e-05       
 (9.77e-05)       
instr2*BRICS -0.000302*’ -0.0004* 0.0285* 39.40*    
 (0.000202) (0.0002) (0.0152)     
                                         Notes:   ***, **, * and *’ denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10%, and 15% levels respectively.   
                                        Numbers in round parentheses (.) are the robust standard errors. Column (1) refers to the coefficients !, ", $, %&'	) in Equation (3). Column (2) linear 
                                        effects are the sum of !	%&' ", non-linear effect is the sum of $	%&'	). The total effects in Column (3) are computed by adding the coefficient !, ", $, %&'	).  
                                        The threshold level is equal to * (,-.)0∗(2-3)*. This computation is done for the comprehensive digitization index and its eight pillars, each one in a turn. 
                                     
 
